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Hanging up on the First Amendment: An
Analysis of Contemporary Telemarketing
Regulations
Brook Dambacher*

I. Introduction
"Hello."
"Yes, hello, uh, is Mr. or Mrs (a complete butchering of the
consumer's name) available?"
"What is this regarding?"
"The deal of a lifetime."
"Of course, sorry, they just stepped out. .
Nearly every consumer in America is familiar with this
hypothetical phone call. In fact, in 1990, a congressional survey
revealed that eighteen million Americans receive telephone
solicitation calls each day.' As annoying and inconvenient as these
calls may be, they also provide people with jobs and many even offer
legitimate products and services to people
that may not be readily
2
able to shop outside of their 3homes. In fact, telemarketing sales
generated $435 billion in 1990.
As annoying and frustrating as these telephone calls may be,
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constitutional considerations dictate that the government cannot
necessarily place a blanket ban on all of these calls.4 Instead, the First
Amendment interests of telemarketers must be balanced against the
consumer's privacy interests. 5 As a result, many state legislatures
have enacted a variety of approaches in an attempt to balance these
interests. 6 These approaches include encouraging consumers to use
the means available to them, passing statutes requiring solicitors to
maintain no-call lists, and banning all calls placed by automated
calling machines.7 Such initiatives give rise to serious issues about
how far consumer protection should reach. Is it proper for consumer
protection legislation to reach into the sphere of the First
Amendment? Is it proper to punish a telemarketer for the failure of
the consumer to engage in appropriate action?
This paper will first discuss the history of regulation in the
telemarketing industry. 9 Next, the paper will look at the radical
approach taken by the Arkansas legislature, which made these calls
potentially criminal. t o The paper will then critique the Arkansas

4 Shannon, supra note 1, at 382.

Id. Sherrie Marshall, who was a former Commissioner at the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), clarifies what these competing interests
mean: "[tielemarketing, by its very nature, presents policy-makers with two
seemingly conflicting interests: Those of responsible telemarketers trying to
conduct their business, and those of consumers with legitimate expectations of
privacy in their.. .homes ..."Id.
5

6

id.

7 Id. at 383.
8

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceable to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This Amendment has been
interpreted as protecting both the speech of callers as well as the right of the
consumer to receive information. See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited
Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99 (1986). However,
because the typical consumer in this case has expressed a desire to not receive the
information, the First Amendment right of the caller will be focused on exclusively.
9 The telemarketing problem is in reference to the attempts to balance the First
Amendment interests of the telemarketers against the privacy interests of the
consumers. See infra Part II (discussing telemarketing regulations, constitutional
concerns associated with telemarketing, and some proposed solutions).
'0 See infra Part III.
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statute and the Court of Appeals opinion that upheld 'the statute.1 1
Finally, the paper will discuss
the impact of the statute and decision
12
on the interests involved.

II. Background
The background of this article will first explain the history of
government and private regulation of telemarketing, and will then
define the1 3 constitutional concerns inherent in the "telemarketing
problem."

A. Governmental Regulation of Telemarketers
Governmental regulation of telemarketing has occurred on
both the state and federal level. At the federal level, the two main
pieces of telemarketing legislation are the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. Regulation at the
state level has been less comprehensive and thus has generated a
variety of legislation. Statewide do-not-call lists have been among the
more successful of these attempts.
1. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act
The first major federal legislation aimed at restricting
telemarketing was the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
14 One of the motivating factors for the
("TCPA").
enactment of this
legislation was the use of automated telemarketing machines. 15 The
TCPA made it a violation of federal law to use these machines
without prior approval from the consumer receiving the call.' 6
I"

See infra Part IV.

12

See infra Part IV.

13 See infra Part

II. A - B.

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(6),
105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (1991).
15 Shannon, supra note 1, at 388. This was a blanket ban on pre-recorded
messages that are left on a answering machine or played to a caller when a number
is dialed by an automated machine. Id. The TCPA made it a federal violation to
"initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the
called party." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (2002).
16 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (2002). The use of automatic dialers are not just
annoying, they can also be very dangerous. Arcadi, supra note 3, at 419. The
14
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While this solved the problem of automated calls, Congress
determined that live-operator calls could not be subjected to a similar
blanket ban because of the First Amendment considerations of free
speech and free expression. 17 Instead, the TCPA gave the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") broad discretion as to the
methods it may use to deal with live operator phone calls.18 The
FCC's efforts culminated in legislation that required individual
telemarketers to keep their own lists of people who desired to be on a
no-call list.' 9 This was not the strictest approach possible, as the FCC
could have mandated a national no-call directory. 20
The Act provided two different remedies. The first remedy
was a private right of action for the consumer and the second remedy
was a state right of action. 2 1 The statute provides for injunctive or
monetary damages. In addition, the TCPA provides telemarketers
with an affirmative defense if they can prove that they2 implemented
reasonable procedures to prevent violations of the rule. 2
2. The Telemarketing Sales Rule
In 1994, Congress, in an attempt to supplement the TCPA,
enacted the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act, which authorized the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") to prescribe rules prohibiting abusive telemarketing acts and
practices.23 The FTC exercised this authority by adopting the
Telemarketing Sales Rule that regulates a number of different
fraudulent and abusive 24 activities of telemarketers. The
machines dial in a sequential order, so it is possible that they will tie up all of the
lines of an individual business. Id. This is particularly dangerous in the case of
hospitals, where patients cannot contact their physicians, physicians cannot contact
their patients, and even ambulances cannot be contacted. Id.
"

Shannon, supra note 1, at 389.
U.S.C.A. § 227(c)(1)(a) (stating that the FCC may require "the use of

18 47

electronic databases, telephone network technologies, special directory markings,
.
and industry-based or company-specific 'do-not-call' systems .
20

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(i) (2002).
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3); 47 U.S.C. § 227(0(1).

21

Id.

22

id.

23

Shannon supra note 1, at 391.

19

Id. at 392. The FTC defines an "abusive practice" as initiating an outbound
telephone call to a person that has stated that they do not wish to receive calls from
24
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consequences for violating such regulations can include a fine of up
to $10,000 per violation.

3. State Regulation of Telemarketers
In addition to federal government actions, states also retain

the authority to regulate telemarketing calls. Initially, there was a
large outpouring of state legislation aimed at solving the
telemarketing problem. Most state statutes require each company to
maintain their own no-call lists.27 These efforts have done little to
appease unhappy consumers who are still removed from call lists one
company at a time. 28 Furthermore, many callers violate the 29law, but
are not being punished at all, to the extent that they could be.
However, other states have begun to maintain statewide no-

call lists and databases. To have their name included in these lists
generally costs the consumer a small initial fee and an even smaller
renewal fee. 30 Any telemarketer that wants to call a resident of that

state must purchase a copy of that list and must refrain from calling

the names on the list under penalty of law. 3 1 Residents of these states
rushed to be included on these lists. 32 By the end of 2000, these lists
included more than 1.6 million people. However, these databases
the seller. Id. However, the rule allows for an affirmative defense by which a seller
can claim that they accidentally called the consumer.
25 Shannon supra note 1, at 392.
26

Id.

Id. at 393. More than 150 bills aimed at telemarketing were introduced in

the first half of 1999. Id.
27 Id.
28

Id.

29

Id. at 412. In Alaska, not a single person has been fined as a result of the

telemarketing legislation. Id. In Arkansas, the state allows telephone solicitors up to
ten free violations before they are fined. Id.
30 See Margie Boule, Telling Telemarketers Where To Go, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Dec. 14, 2000, at E01, available at 2000 WL 27112653. For example,
in Oregon, a resident can pay an initial fee of $6.50 and an annual renewal fee of
$3.00. People on these lists in Oregon are given a hot-line number that they can call
and then the Attorney General will file an action against the telemarketer. Id. To
date, the state has filed over thirty-five lawsuits; they use the money recovered in
the suits to cover the costs of the program. Id.
31 Id.
32

See Shannon, supra note 1, at 410.

33 Id. Some of the statistics supporting the popularity of these databases include
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are not flawless. Many critics point to the numerous exceptions
contained in the regulations,
as well as the far from vigilant
34
statutes.
the
of
enforcement
B. Private Regulation of Telemarketing
Many telemarketers viewed governmental regulation of their
field as a threat and began efforts to pre-empt legislation.35 For
example, the Direct Marketing Association ("DMA") offers a service
to consumers that allows them to write to the DMA and ask to be
included on a non-solicitation list. 36 In turn, the 4,800 business
members 37
of the DMA pledge to refrain from calling these
customers.

In addition, a 1994 congressional staff report recommended
that private company's no-call lists be compared against the no-call
list compiled by an organization called Private Citizen, Inc. 38 This
group has been very successful in their efforts to utilize the federal
39
laws to prevent the calling of customers on no-solicitation lists.
Consumers pay a $20 fee and the organization delivers the names of
these consumers to over 1,000 businesses that utilize telemarketing
along with a notice that if they call any of the numbers on the list,
they will have to pay a fine.4 0 Private Citizen, Inc. reports that they
the fact that 110,000 Missouri residents signed up for the service in the first week
that it was offered. Shannon, supra note 1, at 410. New York has begun compiling
a database that includes 430,000 phone numbers. Id. Also, Tennessee has a
database that includes 535,000 phone numbers. Id.
34 Id.

This is evidenced by the fact that the telemarketing businesses themselves
began to institute measures of regulation on their own. See id. at 391-94.
36 Id. at 386.
35

37 Id.
38

Id. at 387. Private Citizen, Inc. is described as being the first and largest

organization in America specializing in cutting junk calls and junk mail. Id. This
organization maintains a directory of those who have requested to be on a nonsolicitation list. Id. In addition, the organization also provides consumer members
with a newsletter and information on telemarketing laws. Id. The directory is sent
to over 1500 firms that use telemarketing. Id. The organization reports that it has
seen a huge drop in solicitation calls since the directory has been established. Id.
39 id.

40 Arcadi, supra note 3, at 418. The warning that is placed on the list of names
reads as follows, "I will accept junk calls, placed by or on your behalf, for a $100
fee, due within thirty days of such use. . . .Your junk call will constitute your
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have collected $700,000 in fines and settlements since 1996.41
C. Constitutional Considerations
When analyzing the constitutional considerations of
42
telemarketing, two competing interests are at issue. The First
Amendment interests of the caller must be weighed against the
privacy interests of the consumer. 43 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court held that commercial speech is not completely
outside the protection of the First Amendment. an In that case, the
court voided a Virginia statute that prevented a licensed pharmacist
of prescription
from advertising the price
..
... drugs on the grounds
45 that it
was an impermissible restraint on commercial free speech. More
recently, in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better
Environment, the Court held that "solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech" and
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.46 In that case, the
court struck down an ordinance that required a non-profit
organization to obtain a permit for solicitation if the group used more
than twenty-five percent of its revenue to pay the salaries of its
canvassers.4 7 Furthermore, content-regulated commercial speech is
afforded the same First Amendment analysis regardless of whether it
comes from a charitable or commercial solicitor.48
Because the First Amendment protects commercial speech
from impermissible government regulation, the Court has developed
a standard to determine whether a particular regulation may be

agreement to the reasonableness of my fee." Id.
41 Shannon, supra note 1, at 382.
42

Id. at 383.

43 Id.

44

425 U.S. 748, 762 (1975).

45

id.

46

444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).

id.
48 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). The court here
noted that even though the state has power to regulate commercial speech under
some circumstances, it may not use this power to limit the content of commercial
speech, and that such regulations must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 577.
47
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sustained. 49 The standard basically consists of three elements. 50 First,
does the regulation have a direct and substantial effect on the
solicitation activity? 5' Second, does the regulation serve a sufficiently
strong state interest?.9 Third, is the regulation narrowly drawn so that
53
it does not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment freedoms?
The first element, whether the regulation has a direct impact,
is easily answered in the case of telemarketing calls. If the regulation
serves to limit or prohibit the calls, then the regulation clearly has a
direct and substantial effect.
The second element, whether the regulation serves a
sufficiently strong state interest, has also been answered by the
courts. On the consumer side of the equation, courts have held that in
determining what limits are appropriate on protected speech, the
nature of the forum plays an integral role. 54 Courts have held that
protecting the citizen from unwanted communications that come into
the private forum of their home is a legitimate state interest. In
addition, the court in Schaumburg stated that a village has a
legitimate interest in protecting the public from fraud, crime, and
undue annoyance.55 In general, either of these two interests will
function to fulfill the sufficient state interest requirement of the above
three-prong test.
Therefore, the main issue is whether the third element has
been met. This question must be answered under the facts and

49 Arcadi, supra note 3, at 423.

50 Id. The court in a previous decision held that there was an additional
element. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
the Court held that the first element should be a determination that the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Because the determination
has already been made that the speech at issue here is protected, only the last three
elements listed in the paper will be considered.
" Arcadi, supra note 3, at 423.
52 id.
Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984).
54 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988). Courts consistently have held
that the home of the consumer is a private forum, and that protecting the citizen
from unwanted communications that enter this forum is a legitimate state interest.
Id. In determining the nature of the forum, the courts take into consideration the
character of the property at issue. Id. In the realm of telemarketing, the forum is the
place where the telemarketing call is received, which is generally in the home of
the consumer. Id.
55 Vill. of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637.
53
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circumstances surrounding the particular legislative act. The question
of whether something is narrowly drawn in a manner sufficient to
pass First Amendment scrutiny is not always answered affirmatively.
For example, in Schaumburg, the Court determined that a ban on
solicitation for a charity that did not use even three-fourths of its
donations for charitable purposes was not narrowly drawn. The Court
decided this because while even a lower percentage could potentially
indicate fraud, this alone was not a sufficient connection between
fraud and the banned solicitation. 56 The next section of the paper will
focus on the application of this standard to a controversial Arkansas
statute.

IlI. Discussion
This portion of the paper will first analyze the statute that the
Arkansas legislature adopted in response to the "telemarketing
problem." This will be followed by a discussion of National
Federationof the Blind v. Arkansas,57 the case that presented a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of the Arkansas statute.
A. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-201
The proper title of the Arkansas Code Provision at issue in
this case is "Caller identification - Information offered - Penalty for

violation." 58 The statute begins with the requirement that any person
placing a telephone call to an Arkansas resident offering any
commercial product or service or soliciting a charitable contribution
must identify themselves and the organization.59 The caller must also,
at that time, state the purpose of the telephone call along with a brief
description of what is being offered. 6°
The second portion of the statute states that if the consumer
receiving the telephone call indicates that they do not want to hear the
information the caller is offering, then the caller shall not attempt to
provide the consumer with any more information about these matters

56
57

Id.

Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001).

58 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-201
59 Id.

6 id.

(2002).
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during the telephone call.61 The statute then defines the possible
punishments for a violation of these duties. 62 The statute enumerates
a wide range of possible penalties. 63 Also, the statute states that a
violation of the section is an unfair and deceptive act or practice, as
defined by the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and that all remedies,
penalties, and authority granted to the Attorney General under that
Act shall be available to the Attorney General for the enforcement of
the provision. 64 Further, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the
penalties section states in subsection (b) that "[a] violation of this
section is a Class A misdemeanor. ' ' 65 Therefore, the legislature of
Arkansas, through the enactment of this statute, made a consumer's
failure to hang-up a crime of the telemarketer.
B. NationalFederationof the Blind v. Arkansas
Arkansas Statute Section 4-99-201 drew almost immediate
attention because of the criminal penalty. While this was not the first
time a criminal penalty had been imposed as part of a telemarketing
regulation, the penalty was unique for the fact that the criminal
punishment was not imposed because the caller violated a no-call list;
instead the punishment was imposed when a caller made a 6erfectly
legal call, but the consumer failed to hang-up the telephone.
The constitutionality of the statute was attacked in a facial
challenge by the National Federation of the Blind of Arkansas
("NFBA") and Larry Wyland. 67 The portion of the statute challenged
by the plaintiffs contains the following subsection:

61

ARK. CODE ANN. §

4-99-201 (2002).

62 Id.

63 Id.

64 Id. The statute then specifies that the section does not limit the rights or
remedies that are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law, and that
the obligations of the statute are cumulative and should not be deemed to limit the
obligations imposed under any other law. Id.
65 id.

Boule, supra note 30. Oregon had a telemarketing statute that provided that
if companies violated settlement agreements imposed as a consequences of a "nocall-list" violation, then the owners of the company could be put in jail for up to six
months. Id.
66

67 Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 258 F.3d at 854. The National Federation
of the

Blind is an Arkansas charity that routinely solicits contributions. Id. Larry Wyland
is a blind resident of Arkansas. Id.

Hanging up on the FirstAmendment
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(2) If the person receiving the telephone call indicates
that he or she does not want to hear about the charity,
goods, or services, the caller shall not attempt to
provide additional information during that conversation
about the charity, goods, or services.
The plaintiffs also contest the penalty of a Class A misdemeanor
Act. 69
and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices
They alleged that the statute should have been declared
unconstitutional because it violates their First Amendment rights, it
violates their Fourteenth Amendment rights, and should be declared
void-for-vagueness. 7 ° The state filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that the statute was constitutional on
its face. 7 1 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas agreed with the state and held that the statute was
constitutional. The plaintiffs appealed and the case went up to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed
the decision of the district court by holding that the statute was
constitutional on the grounds presented below.
1. First Amendment Concerns
The appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that
the statute was a direct government regulation on speech because the
regulation was equivalent to compelled silence. 73 Therefore, because
it can be viewed as "compelled silence," and because the charity
fund-raising speech involved is protected by the First Amendment,
the statute must survive the First Amendment scrutiny if it is to be
held constitutional.74
The direct effect requirement of the First Amendment review
is satisfied here by the fact that the regulation places restrictions on

68
69

id.
Id.

70 Id. They argued that their right to solicitation was protected under the First
Amendment. See supra note 9.
"' Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 258 F.3d at 854.
72 id.

73 Id. The court states that "when government cuts off debate by decreeing that
a dialog must end, it is regulating speech." Id.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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the business of the telemarketers.75 Therefore, a government
regulation that limits such activity can only be constitutional if two
conditions are met.76 First, the regulation must serve a "sufficientl!
strong, subordinating interest that the state is entitled to protect."
Second, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to serve that state
interest "without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment
freedoms.' ,,78 In applying the above standard to the statute at issue, the
court noted that the statute only limited the solicitation activity of
charities in certain circumstances, but did not serve as a blanket
restriction. 79 The court stated that:
The government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech,
provided the restrictions are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
80
channels for communication of the information.
To this end, the court acknowledged that the state has a wellrecognized interest in protecting the ability of a consumer to avoid
unwanted communications in their home. 81 The court further
explained that communications that enter the home are different than
communications in a public forum because the former is an intrusion
of privacy. 82 According to the court, because the communications
have entered the home, the interest of the state
83 is sufficient to pass
analysis.
Amendment
First
the
of
portion
that
75
76

77
78

See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.

71 Nat' Fed'n of the Blind, 258 F.3d at 856. The court noted that
the
regulation only affects telephone calls to unwilling listeners in their homes. Id.
80 Id. at 855 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791

(1989)).
81

Id.

Id. The court notes that in the public forum, those that do not want to be part
of the communication have the opportunity to avoid offensive speech "by averting
their eyes" or plugging their ears. Id.
83 Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 258 F.3d at 855. The court also noted that the
82
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The court held that the impact the statute had on free speech
was narrowly drawn and insubstantial, and therefore could withstand
First Amendment scrutiny. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was
not narrowly drawn because consumers have other ways to prevent
the communications from reaching them. 84 The court held that the
regulation was narrowly drawn because the only requirement it
imposes is that the offending caller ends the call.85 Further, the
analysis of whether the regulation is drawn narrowly is not affected
by the size of the benefit to the public, however small.86 In addition,
the court held that there was not a substantial effect because the
statute did not prohibit an organization from calling an Arkansas
resident, and the only impact of the statute "is to end solicitation calls
to unwilling residents who otherwise would not hang up." The court
noted that simply because the statute ended calls, it still left open
non-criminal, alternative
means of communication with these
87
unwilling listeners.
The court stated that they are not in the position to secondguess the Arkansas legislature's conclusion that many consumers
have difficulty with telemarketers and reasonably need help in
dealing with this problem, and that this statute is narrowly drawn to
reasonably help them deal with the problem. 88 The court also noted
that the statute is not overbroad because there is not a significant
danger that the statute will significantly compromise the protection of
the First Amendment
rights of parties not before the court in the
89
case.
present

Supreme Court also held that a vendor had no right under the Constitution or any
other authority to send unwanted materials into the home of another. Id. (citing
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970)).
84 Id. at 856. The plaintiff advanced that the residents could protect themselves
from unwanted calls by using unlisted numbers, by screening their call with
answering machines, by using caller identification devices or by hanging up the
telephone. Id.
85 id.
86

Id.

87 Id. At this point, the court noted that it would not express an opinion on
whether the State was correct in asserting that the proper statutory construction
meant that these penalties would also apply to immediate callbacks. Id. However,
the court does note that if this was to be a proper interpretation of the statute, then it
would certainly increase the restriction that the statute places on speech. Id.
88 Id.

89 Id.
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2. Fourteenth Amendment Concerns
The court quickly dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment
concerns by stating that "[b]ecause charity solicitors do not have an
absolute First Amendment right to press their telephone messages on
unwilling households, the statute may draw rational distinctions
among speakers who are not similarly situated." 90 Therefore, because
Arkansas' legislature decided that the consumers needed more
protection from charity and commercial solicitors than other callers,
these groups are not similarly situated and may be treated differently
as long as the distinction is rational. 91
3. Public Policy and Other Concerns
This court noted that the plaintiffs were not correct when they
argued that there would be harm to the residents of Arkansas because
solicitors would misread the statute and believe that it meant that they
could not contact Arkansas residents at all.92 The court stated that
there was simply no evidence that this was correct.
The plaintiffs also expressed concern over the fact that the
statute did not make clear what the term "indicates" means, as stated
to in the statute. 93 The court then explained away the ambiguity of the
statutory language by quoting the United States Supreme Court in
stating: "Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language. The words of
the.. .ordinance are marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth,
rather than meticulous specificity, but we think it is clear what the

90 Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 258 F.3d at 856.
91 Id. at 857.
92 id.

93 Id. The plaintiffs argued that the lack of a definition of this term made the
statute impermissibly vague because it required the caller to guess when a
consumer's response rose to the level that it would be seen as an "indication," thus
requiring the telemarketer to end the call. Id. The court noted .that the term could be
readily defined by the common meaning and by the dictionary definition. Id. The
court did not address the fact that this guess on the telemarketer's part would give
rise to a risk of criminal prosecution. Id. The court also noted that even though the
plaintiffs listed possible ambiguous responses that would leave the caller guessing,
the Attorney General of Arkansas interpreted the statute as requiring an
"affirmative and clear indication" that the consumer did not want the call to
continue. Id. The court held that this was sufficient to ensure that the statute would
not be enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Id.

2002]
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94
ordinance as a whole prohibits."

IV. Analysis / Impact
The Eighth Circuit applied a liberal First Amendment
standard to a statute that imposed a criminal penalty on a free speech
violation. The decision takes telemarketing reform a step too far.
Because of the vague language of the statute, the weak competing
state interest that the court mistakenly assumes was present, and the
sufficiency of the alternative options, the statute should have been
struck down as unconstitutional.
A. The Language of the Statute Requires the Caller to Balance
Their Intuition Against a Criminal Record
In National Federation of the Blind, the plaintiffs contended
that the statute should be unconstitutional because it is void-forvagueness. The court dismissed this argument too quickly with the
blanket excuse that statutory language can never be mathematically
certain, but that the meaning of the ordinance is clear. 95 However,
fundamental tenents of criminal law establish that this excuse cannot
be sufficient when a criminal penalty is attached to the statute.
One of the requirements for a defendant to be charged with a
crime is that the defendant has notice that the alleged act was
criminal at the time it was committed.96 This notice need not be
actual notice, but constructive notice is required. 9 ' In other words,
notice is sufficient if the defendant could ascertain that his conduct
constitutes criminal action. 98 For this to occur, the necessary conduct
must be criminal under the law when it is consummated. The main
justification for this fundamental legal principle is the need for
stability in the law.9 9 This requires that the reasonably objective

94 Id.

95 Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
96 See JOHN KAPLAN,

ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL

LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 111-70 (4th ed. 2000). This is also referred to as the
principle of legality. Id. at 153.
97 Id.
98

Id.

99 Id.
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person has notice that their actions are criminal.100 This provides the
average person with the tools necessary
to conform their conduct to
0
the requirements of the criminal law.' '
In the present case, this requirement of illegality is not
sufficiently fulfilled. The potential defendant (i.e., the caller) does not
even have the tools to ascertain whether their conduct is criminal.
Generally, these tools are found within the statute: However, in the
Arkansas statute, the wording is too vague for a reasonably objective
person to understand that their conduct may be criminal. The statute
requires that the caller hang-up when the consumer "indicates that he
or she does not want to hear about [the product, service, or good
being offered]." However, the statute does not explain what such an
indication may be. For example, is silence, a sigh, or an ambiguous
response a sufficient indication to invoke the criminal penalty if the
caller does not hang-up?
The fact that the court declined to rule on the proper statutory
construction of the statute adds to the statute's vagueness. The caller
is unsure about what constitutes an indication; they are also unclear
as to whether the statute prohibits call-backs.1° 2 While this may seem
like a minor semantics debate, when a criminal penalty is attached, it
becomes a much more serious issue. Therefore, because the statute
does not conform to the principle of legality, it should have been
struck down on void-for-vagueness grounds.
B. The Purported State Interest Was Not Present and Therefore
the Statute Could Not Survive First Amendment Scrutiny
In National Federationof the Blind, the court acknowledged
that the state had a sufficient interest in protecting the ability of a
consumer to avoid unwanted communications in their home.' The
court stated that communications that enter the home are different
than communications in the public forum. This is because in a public
forum, those that do not want to be part of the communication have
the opportunity to avoid offensive speech "by averting their eyes" or
plugging their ears.
The distinction that the court draws here is faulty in light of
modem
technology.
Because
of the
developments
in

ioo KAPLAN, supra note 96, at 153.
101

Id.

102 Id.

103

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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telecommunication, those who are truly offended by the calls can
take steps to eliminate the annoyance. Through the use of answering
machine screening, caller ID devices, and privacy manager options
on the telephone, the consumer in the private forum can ust as easily
avert their eyes or plug their ears as in a public forum.1 6i In addition,
the justification that the state has a sufficient interest in protecting a
consumer from unwanted communications is not appropriate in light
of the facts of the case.1°5 The Arkansas statute does not prevent
communications from entering the home. t ° 6 In fact, the statute
expressly authorizes the caller to make the telephone call as long as
they meet a few specific requirements. Therefore, the communication
only becomes unwanted after it has already entered a private home.
Once the consumer has been given the information required
by the statute, they have a simple choice: continue to listen or decline
and hang-up the telephone. The only true interest advanced by the
statute is the protection of people that have expressed the desire not
to hear about a product or service, yet fail to hang-up the telephone.
The protection of this small group of people, who may be
characterized as irrational for their failure to hang-up the telephone,
can hardly be considered a state interest strong enough to offset the
First Amendment interests of the seller.
C.

The Alternative Options Are a Sufficient Solution to the
Telemarketing Problem

Because the state interest should be properly characterized as
the protection of consumers that do not cut off unwanted
solicitations, there are two solutions that can protect these consumers
by stopping the communication from entering their homes. First, no07
solicitation directories can prevent customers from being solicited.,
Second, the consumer can utilize new telephone technologies to
screen the unwanted calls before they are received. 0 8

'04 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the new telephone technologies and other
alternative solutions to the telemarketing problem).

1o5 See supra Part III (discussing the court's reasoning behind holding that
there was a sufficient state interest).
106 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-99-201 (2002).
107See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the option of no-call directories and

databases).
108 See supra note 84 (enumerating the new developments in telephone
technology that consumers can utilize to prevent unwanted telemarketing calls).
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There is no reason to believe that imposing a criminal penalty,
as the Arkansas statute does, will protect people anymore than nosolicitation directories or new telephone technologies. These
solutions take the appropriate approach to the problem by requiring
those consumers to take actions to protect themselves. By utilizing
these services, their privacy rights will be preserved and there will
not be an infringement upon the First Amendment rights of the
callers. The end result is that the callers that fail to hang-up after they
have expressed their discontent will not cause a criminal penalty to
be imposed on another person due to their irrational behavior.
Unfortunately, as a result of the liberal application of the First
Amendment standard, telemarketers are now forced to interpret
vague language at the risk of criminal prosecution under a statute that
should not have properly withstood First Amendment scrutiny. 09 The
liberal application of the First Amendment standard dilutes the
strength of the First Amendment. By holding that the protection of a
small group of people who refuse to hang-up the telephone is a
sufficient state interest, the court opens the doors for any number of
interests that would be sufficient by that standard. Instead, the
traditional state interests should be adhered to in order to preserve the
integrity of the First Amendment.
In addition, requiring a consumer who refuses to hang-up the
telephone to take affirmative steps in preventing the unwanted
communications serves the broad public policy of avoiding the
wasteful use of government resources on protecting those that can
protect themselves. Furthermore, state, do-not-call lists, state
databases, and new telephone technologies adequately protect
consumers, while respecting the rights of the callers.' 10 Finally, the
penalties that may be imposed on callers do not match the "crime."
While it is true that misdemeanors generally do not carry any jail
sentence and the violator simply has to pay a fine, the penalties of
this statute may lead to harsher consequences. The possibility exists
that due to a prior criminal offense, an individual could be on
probation, and any further criminal violation could result in the
individual having their parole revoked. In these instances, an
individual could be sent to jail because a consumer, unknown to
them, does not make a clear indication that they do not want any
more information and the consumer does not hang-up the telephone.
'09 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing an argument that the
wording of the Arkansas statute is too vague).
110 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the new telephone technologies and other
alternative solutions to the telemarketing problem).
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Allowing the statute to stand protects irrational behavior, while
harming both the caller and the consumer.

V. Conclusion
The Eighth Circuit applied a'liberal First Amendment
standard to a statute that imposed a criminal penalty on a free speech
violation. The decision takes telemarketing reform a step too far.
Because of the vague language of the statute, the weak competing
state interest that the court mistakenly assumes was present, and the
sufficiency of alternative options, the statute should have been struck
down as unconstitutional.' Instead, the Arkansas decision is likely
to deter callers from providing certain products and services to
consumers. Consumers that are not able to shop outside of the home
may not have the opportunity to obtain certain products and services.
Telemarketers may lose their jobs or end up in jail, all because a
consumer refused to hang-up the telephone. In short, if you are ever
solicited for a product in Arkansas that you do not want, make sure to
hang-up the telephone - someone's freedom may be at stake.

"

See supra Part IV (analyzing the shortcomings of the Arkansas statute).

